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IN THE SUPREME CQU,RT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
.1. SEAL,
Plain.tiff nnd Appellnnt,

vs.

10171

TAYCO INC.,
'

Case
No.

Defendant and Respondent.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
''AMSCO" WAS NOT LIABLE FOR SPECIAL DAMAGES
UNDER THE EXPRE,SS TERMS OF iT'HE CONT'RAIGT IN
QUESTION AND THE DAMAGES AWARDED TO R!ESPONDENT BY THE DISPUTED OFFSiET WAS FOR S1PEGIAL
DAMAGES.

Respondent has failed to advance any meaning
whatsoever for the exculpatory sentence involved in this
case and asks this Court to interpret the paragraph
in question as having exactly the same meaning without
it a~ with it in. Such construction is, of course, contrary
to law.
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In 12 Am. J ur., (Contracts) Section 241 it states the
law as follows :
"Such an interpretation must be adopted as
will render the whole agreement operative, if it
can, consistently and reasonably be done. So far
as possible effect will be given to all the language
and to every clause of the agreement. No word
should be rejected as mere surplusage if the court
can discover any reaso_nable purpose· thereof
which can be gathered from the whole instrument. An interpretation which gives reasonable
meaning to all its provisions will be preferred
to one which leaves a portion of the writing useless or inexplicable. Only when parts of a written
agreement are S'O radically repugnant that there
is no rational interpretation that will render them
effective and accordant must any part perish."
Realizing this ~Court would probably ~~ie. to
eliminate entirely the exculpatory sentence in question,
Respondent seeks to avoid its application in this case
on the grounds that the damage·s allowed in the disputed
offset weTe not in fact special damages.
:The main reason for distinguishing between general
and spe'cial damages relates to the necessity to plead the
special circumstances on which the latter are based in
in order to be recoverable. If a party entitled to damages has suffered a loss greater than would normally
follow a breach of contract because of special cir'Cumstances (such as the loss of profits on an exist:irig contract, as here) and these circumstances were known to
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the other party whPn the contract was formed, these additional damages are recoverable if properly pleaded.
Thore is no question of proper pleading of Respondent's
los~ of profit, but could the respondent have recovered
for them ( setting aside for the moment the effect of the
Pxculpatory contract limitation) if they had not been
specially pleaded¥ If not, they are special damages and
within the contract exclusion in question.
In 15 Am. J ur. (Damages), Sec. 321, it states:
"One who desires to recover for loss of prospective profits for breach of a contract must
allege the facts and circumstan'ces and knowledge
of the situation brought home to the other party
at the time the contract was entered into."
(citing Goodwin & Southern R. Co., 125 Ga. 630, S.E. 720)

Respondent appears to classify as special damages
only those that are so speculative and remote, arising
out of possible future business, that they would not be
recoverable regardless of how expressly they were
pleaded.

The fact that the mnount re'coverable as special
drunages is necessarily greater and in addition to general
drunages is the very reason why a seller who can not
guarantee a delivery date because the goods must be
manufactured needs to eliminate exposure as to them
l'n~n in ordinary circumstances although willing, as here,
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to assume liability for the usual damages except where
the causes of delay are extraordinary.
The trial judge recognized that the damages sought
to be offset were special and so denominated them in his
instructions (R 70, 71).
Footnote number 18 to the authority cited by Respondent on this point (15 Am. Jur. (Damages) Sec. 152
says:
"No court in modern times, howsoever extreme may be its holding, permits the recovery
of prospective profits as special damages unless
they came within the limits laid down in Hadley
vs. Boxendale." American R .Exp. Co. vs. Steinberg, 208 Ky. 251, 270 S.W. 756, 42 ALR 705.
(Underscoring added)

POINr II
THE CONTR.A!CT OF SALE DID NOT 'PROVIDE FOR
DELIVER.Y BY A'PRIL 15, 1957, AND ISO WAS NOT
BR,E.A:CHED BY APRIL 10, 1957.

Appellant does not quarrel with the law cited by
Respondent to the effect that questions concerning the
existence of and bre,ach of contract are jury questions
when the facts are in dispute. Here, however, the facts
are not in dispute and Respondent has failed to point
out in the record any evidence that "AMSCO" had
agreed to a delivery date of April 1st. Certainly none

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

the documentary evidence shows it and Mr. ~Taylor's
t i'stimony that !\l r. Welch said after February 22, 1957,
'' Eh· would do his best to rneet the April15, 1957 deadline"
would not supply any such· proof for good businesses
ahvays sePk custmner satisfaction beyond their legal
1inhility.
o i'

POINT III
THE CONTRACT WAS CANCELLED BY MUTUAL CONSENT.

Respondent contends that any evidence of an agreeInl'nt of recession and consideration to support it is "completely lacking in this case." Appellant submits that
Exhibit 9, the letter of May 4, 1957, from Mr. Taylor to
A~1SCO containing "Please . . . cancel our order No.
7144 for Palisades Contractors" and Mr. Taylor's testimony that "AJ\1:SCO" never billed for these tract shoes
( H-W, 4:7) and that he "considered I had canceUed it
and I didn't do any more about it" (R 59} although he
saw "Al\ISCO's" representative about monthly for nearly two years thereafter (64, R 67), all of which was cited
in the Brief of Appellant, clearly established a mutual
agreement to cancel the order and a mutual agreement
to rescind an executory contract provides adequate legal
consideration as each party thereby suffers a legal detriment in giving up his rights to performance or damages
from the other (17 C.J.S. ( Contracts) Sec 391). There
wa~ no conflict in the evidence on this point to make it
a jury question so its submission to the jury was error.
1
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POINT IV
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES.

:This point is abandoned by appellant since not raised
in the trial court.

POINT V
TTME OF ESS!ENOE.

This point is abandoned by appellant since not raised
in the trial court.

POINT VI
'.DHE .A:MOUNT OF OFFSE'T ALLOWE'D BY THE JURY
IN EX!CE!SS OF $1,694.40 W.A!S NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIrDEN'CE.

All of the evidence of this point was documentary
and the only possible difference in the price of the track
shoes payable by the buyer in determining his profits
would be whether the shoes ordered were the no•n skid
type ($44.00/100# less discount/dozen) or not ($34.65/100
less discount/ dozen) as quoted on EtXhihit 2 and all of
the evidence on this point shows that the non skid type
were ordered (Exhibit 3). Under these circumstances,
it is not surprising that Respondent made no effort
whatsoever to point to any evidence that would jusitfy
the mnount of the jury award in this case.
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CPrtainly this Court can not properly allow an award
to stand which is not supported by the evidence merely
bt>(•amw it is less than the ainount requested by the suc<'Pssful party as HPspondent argues on this point.

CONOL,USION
The contract in question absolved "AMSCO" of any
liability for special damages and the offset of special
drunages awarded R.espondent in the lower court should
LH_' set aside and judgment entered for Appellant for the
admitted liability of the account sued on. Even if this
were not so, there was no contract by "AMS.CO" for
delivery prior to the time of cancellation by Respondent's
assignor or any such contract was rescinded by mutual
consent so the result should be the same.
Even if Appellant is in error as to the above conclusions, the judgment should be increased to $1,790.62
plus interest since no evidence supported any offset in
t'xeess of $1,694.40.
R.espectfully submitted,
HANSEN & SUMSTON
65 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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